When we say "I know why he was late", we know not only the fact that he was late, but also an explanation of this fact. We propose a logical framework of "knowing why" inspired by the existing formal studies on why-questions, scientific explanation, and justification logic. We introduce the Ky i operator into the language of epistemic logic to express "agent i knows why ϕ" and propose a Kripke-style semantics of such expressions in terms of knowing an explanation of ϕ. We obtain two sound and complete axiomatizations w.r.t. two different model classes depending on different assumptions about introspection. Finally we connect our logic with justification logic technically by providing an alternative semantics and an in-depth comparison on various design choices.
Introduction
Ever since the seminal work by Hintikka (1962) , epistemic logic has grown into a major subfield of philosophical logic, which has unexpected applications in other fields such as computer science, AI, and game theory [cf. the handbook by van Ditmarsch et al. (2015) ]. Standard epistemic logic focuses on propositional knowledge expressed by "knowing that ϕ". However, there are various knowledge expressions in terms of "knowing whether", "knowing what", "knowing how", and so on, which have attracted a growing interest in recent years [cf. e.g., Wang and Fan (2013) , Fan et al. (2015) , Wang (2018b) , and the survey by Wang (2018a) ].
Among those "knowing-wh", 1 "knowing why" is perhaps the most important driving force behind our advances in understanding the world and each other. For example, we may want to know why (Bird 1998) :
-the window is broken.
-the lump of potassium dissolved.
-he stayed in the café all day.
-cheetahs can run at high speeds.
-blood circulates in the body.
Intuitively, each "knowing why" expression corresponds to an embedded whyquestion. To some extent, the process of knowing the world is to answer why-questions about the world (Hintikka 1981) . In fact, there is a very general connection between knowledge and wh-questions discovered by Hinttika in the framework of quantified epistemic logic (Hintikka 1983) . For example, consider the question Q : "Who murdered Mary?": -The presupposition of Q is that the questioner knows that Mary was murdered by someone, formalized by K∃x M(x, Mary). -The desideratum of Q is that the questioner knows who murdered Mary, which is formalized by ∃xKM(x, Mary). The distinction between the desideratum and the presupposition highlights the difference between de re and de dicto readings of knowing who.
-One possible answer to Q is "John murdered Mary" formalized as M(John, Mary).
However, telling the questioner this fact may not be enough to let the questioner know who murdered Mary since he or she may not have any idea on who John is. Therefore Hintikka also requires the following extra condition. -Conclusiveness of the above answer requires that the questioner also knows who John is (∃xK(John = x)). Conclusive answers realize the desideratum.
However, Hintikka viewed why-questions, such as Q: "Why ϕ is the case?", as a special degenerated case where the presupposition and desideratum are the same:
-The presupposition of Q is Kϕ; -The desideratum of Q is Kϕ.
A different logical theory of why-questions is developed by Hintikka and Halonen (1995) using the inquiry model and the interpolation theorem of first-order logic. However, we do not think why-questions are special if we can quantify over the possible answers to them. Intuitively, an answer to a question "Why ϕ?" is an explanation of the fact ϕ. In this paper, we take the view shared by Koura (1988) and Schurz (2005) :
-The presupposition of Q is that the questioner knows that there is an explanation for the fact ϕ: K∃x E(x, ϕ) . -The desideratum of Q is that the questioner knows why ϕ: ∃xKE (x, ϕ) .
Note that if explanations are factive ∃x E(x, ϕ) → ϕ, then the presupposition K∃x E(x, ϕ) also implies Kϕ in standard quantified (normal) modal logic. Now we have a preliminary logical form of knowing why in terms of the desideratum ∃xKE(x, ϕ) of the corresponding why-question. The next questions are:
1. What are (good) explanations? 2. How can we capture the relation (E above) between an explanation and a proposition in logic?
The two questions are clearly related. To answer the first one, let us look back at the examples we mentioned at the beginning of this introduction. In fact there are different kinds of explanations (Bird 1998 ):
-Causal: The window broke because the stone was thrown at it. -Nomic: 2 The lump of potassium dissolved since as a law of nature potassium reacts with water to form a soluble hydroxide. -Psychological: He stayed in the café all day hoping to see her again.
-Darwinian: Cheetahs can run at high speeds because of the selective advantage this gives them in catching their prey. -Functional: Blood circulates in order to supply the various parts of the body with oxygen and nutrients.
In philosophy of science, the emphasis is on scientific explanations to why questions, which mainly involve Nomic and Causal explanations in the above categorization (Bromberger 1966; Koura 1988; van Fraassen 1980) . According to Schurz (1999) there are three major paradigms in understanding (scientific) explanations: 3 -The nomic expectability approach initiated by Hempel (1965) , where a good explanation to ϕ should make the explanandum ϕ predictable or increases ϕ's expectability. -The causality approach [cf. e.g, Salmon (1984) ], where an explanation to ϕ should give a complete list of causes or relevant factors to ϕ. -The unification approach [cf. e.g., Kitcher (1981) ] where the focus is on the global feature of explanations in a coherent picture.
Our initial inspiration comes from the deductive-nomological model proposed by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) in the first approach mentioned above, which is the mostly discussed (and criticized) model of explanation. The basic idea is that an explanation is a derivation of the explanandum from some universally quantified laws and some singular sentences. Although such a logical empiricist's approach arouse debates for decades, 4 it draws our attention to the inner structure of explanations and its similarity to derivations in logic. In this paper, as the first step towards a logic of knowing why, we would like to stay neutral on different types of explanations and their models, and focus on the most abstract logical structure of (scientific) explanations.
From a structuralist point of view, we only need to know how explanations compose and interact with each other without saying what they are exactly. Now, as for the second question, how can we capture the explanatory relation between explanations and propositions in logic? Our next crucial inspiration came from Justification Logic proposed by Artemov (2008) . Aiming at making up the gap between epistemic logic and the mainstream epistemology where justified true belief is the necessary basis of knowledge, justification logics are introduced based on the ideas of Logic of Proof (LP) by Artemov (1995 Artemov ( , 2001 . 5 Justification logic introduces formulas in the shape of t : ϕ into the logical language, read as "t is a justification of ϕ". 6 Therefore, in justification logic we can talk about knowledge with an explicit justification. Moreover, justifications can be composed using various operations. For example, t: (ϕ → ψ) ∧ s: ϕ → (t · s): ψ is an axiom in the standard justification logic where · is the application operation of two justifications. Explanations may have similar compositional structures. If t is an explanation of the fact ϕ, and s is an explanation (e.g., a logical proof) for the material implication of ϕ → ψ, then combining s and t should in principle give an explanation of the fact ψ.
On the other hand, conceptually, justifications are quite different from explanations. For example, the fact that the shadow of a flagpole is x meters long may justify that the length of the pole is y meters given the specific time and location on earth. However, the length of the shadow of a flagpole clearly does not explain why the pole is y meters long, if we are looking for causal explanations. In general, a justification of ϕ gives a reason to believing ϕ (though not necessarily true), but an explanation gives a reason to being ϕ, presupposing the truth of ϕ. In this paper, we only make use of some technical apparatus of justification logic, and there are quite some differences in our framework compared to justification logic, which will be discussed in Sect. 4.
Putting all the above ideas together, we are almost ready to lay out the basis of our logic of knowing why. Following Wang (2018a), we enrich the standard (multiagent) epistemic language with a new "knowing why" operator Ky i , instead of using a quantified modal language. Roughly speaking, Ky i ϕ is essentially ∃tK i (t: ϕ), although we do not allow quantifiers and terms in the logical language. As in Wang (2015 Wang ( , 2018b and Wang and Fan (2014) , packing the quantifiers and modalities together will help us to control the expressive power of the logic in hopes of a computationally well-behaved logic. For a more general technical discussion of the advantages of such "packed" modalities, see Wang (2017) . The semantics is based on the idea of Fitting model for justification logic.
Since the language has both the standard epistemic operator K i and also the new "knowing why" modality Ky i , there are lots of interesting things that can be expressed. For example, -K i p ∧ ¬Ky i p, e.g, I know that Fermat's last theorem is true but I do not know why. -¬Ky i p ∧ K i Ky j p, e.g., I do not know why Fermat's last theorem holds but I know that Andrew Wiles knows why.
-K i K j p ∧ ¬Ky i K j p, e.g., I know that you know that the paper has been accepted, but I do not know why you know. -Ky i K j p ∧ K i ¬Ky j p, e.g., I know why you know that the paper has been rejected, but I am sure you do not know why.
As we will see later, these situations are all satisfiable in our models. 7 Before going into the technical details, it is helpful to summarize the aforementioned ideas:
-The language is inspired by the treatments of the logics of "knowing what", and "knowing how", where new modalities of such constructions are introduced, without using the full language of quantified epistemic logic. -The formal treatment of explanations is inspired by the formal account of justifications in justification logics. -The semantics of Ky i is inspired by Hintikka's logical formulation of the desideratum of Wh-questions: ∃tK i (t: ϕ).
In the rest of the paper, Sect. 2 lays out the language, semantics and two proof systems of our knowing why logic; Sect. 3 proves the completeness of the two systems, and gives an alternative semantics closer to the standard justification logic; Sect. 4 gives a detailed comparison with various versions of justification logic; Sect. 5 concludes the paper with discussions and future directions.
A logic of knowing why
Definition 1 (Language ELKy) Given a countable set I of agent names and a countably infinite set P of basic propositional letters, the language of ELKy is defined as:
where p ∈ P and i ∈ I.
We use standard abbreviations for , ⊥, ϕ → ψ, ϕ ∨ ψ, and K i ϕ (the dual of K i ϕ). Ky i ϕ says that agent i knows why ϕ (is the case).
Intuitively, necessitation rule for Ky i should not hold, e.g., although something is a tautology, you may not know why it is a tautology. Borrowing the idea from justification logic, we introduce a special set of "self-evident" tautologies which the agents are assumed to know why. Please see Sect. 4 for the comparison with constant specifications in justification logic, which may contain all axioms of the logic.
Definition 2 (Tautology Ground Λ) Tautology Ground Λ is a set of propositional tautologies.
For example, Λ can be the set of all the instances of ϕ ∧ ψ → ϕ and ϕ ∧ ψ → ψ. As we will see later, under such a Λ, Ky i (ϕ ∧ ψ → ϕ) will be valid, which helps the agents to reason more.
The model of our language ELKy is similar to the Fitting model of justification logic (Fitting 2005) . Note that we do not have the justification terms in the logical language, but we do have a set E of explanations as semantic objects in the models. In this work, we require the accessibility relation to be equivalence relations to accommodate the S5 epistemic logic.
where:
-W is a non-empty set of possible worlds. -E is a non-empty set of explanations satisfying the following conditions:
is an admissible explanation function satisfying the following conditions:
-V : P → 2 W is a valuation function.
Note that E does not depend on possible worlds, thus it can be viewed as a constant domain of explanations closed under an application operator · which combines two explanations into one. Note that we do not have other operators such as sum (+) as in justification logic. We will come back to this with an in-depth comparison with justification logic in Sect. 4. The special element e in E is the self-evident explanation, which is uniform for all the self-evident formulas in Λ. The admissible explanation function E specifies the set of worlds where t is an explanation of ϕ. It is possible that some formula has no explanation at all on some world, 8 and some formula has more than one explanation on some world, e.g., one theorem may have different proofs. 9 The first condition of E captures the composition of explanations resembling the reasoning of knowing why by modus ponens, which amounts to the later axiom
Definition 4 (Semantics) The satisfaction relation of ELKy formulas on pointed models is as below:
Now it is clear that our Ky i ϕ is roughly ∃tK i (t: ϕ) ∧ K i ϕ though there are subtle details to be discussed in Sect. 4 when compared to justification logic. Also note that Ky i ϕ → K i ϕ is clearly valid, but Ky i -necessitation is not since not all valid formulas are explained except those in Λ. Moreover, things we usually take for granted are not valid either, e.g.,
is not valid in general: The fact that I have explanations for ϕ and ψ, respectively, does not mean that I have an explanation for the co-occurrence of the two, e.g., quantum mechanics and general relativity have their own explanatory power on microcosm and macrocosm, respectively, but a "theory of everything" is not obtained by simply putting these two theories together.
As an example, in the following model (reflexive arrows are omitted), the formula K i p ∧ ¬Ky i p ∧ Ky j p ∧ K i Ky j p holds on the middle world, where we use t : :ϕ on a world w to mean w ∈ E(t, ϕ). In this paper, we also consider models with special properties. First of all, we are interested in the models where explanations are always correct, i.e., if a proposition has an explanation on a world, then it must be true.
Definition 5 (Explanation Factivity) An ELKy-model M has the explanation factivity provided that, whenever w ∈ E(t, ϕ), then M, w ϕ.
Note that this property is different from the factivity for K W i, i.e., Ky i ϕ → ϕ is valid. Philosophically explanation factivity is debatable, 11 but as we will see later in Theorem 10, our logics stay neutral on it: assuming it or not will not affect the logics.
Besides explanation factivity, it is also debatable whether knowing why is introspective. Based on the current semantics, it is not hard to see that the following introspection axioms on knowing why are valid:
However, what about the following ones? Note that they are not valid without further conditions on our models.
One may argue that there is always a self-evident explanation to your own knowledge or ignorance, but another may say it happens a lot that you just forgot why you know some facts. Things can be even more complicated regarding nested Ky i . Your explanation for why ϕ holds may be quite different from the explanation for why you know why ϕ, e.g., the window is broken (ϕ) because you know a stone was thrown at it, and you know why you know why ϕ because someone told you so. On the other hand, if you know why a theorem holds because of a proof, it seems reasonable to assume that you know why you know why the theorem holds: you can just verify the proof. The cases of negative introspection may invoke more debates.
As a first attempt to a logic of knowing why, we want to remain neutral in the philosophical debate, but would like to make it technically possible to handle the cases when introspection is considered reasonable. The following property guarantees that the above introspection axioms are valid.
Definition 6 (Introspection Property) An ELKy-model M has the introspection property provided that, whenever M, w ϕ and ϕ has the form of
We use C, C F , C I , C F I to denote respectively the model classes of all ELKymodels, factive models, introspective models, and models with both properties.
However, as we will see below, factivity does not affect the valid formulas. For an arbitrary M ∈ C, we can construct a new ELKy-model M F ∈ C F which has factivity.
We will show that M, w and M F , w satisfy the same ELKy formulas, thus by the above definition of E F , it is clear that M F has explanation factivity.
Lemma 7 For any ELKy-formula ϕ and any
Proof We can prove it by induction on the structure of formulas. It is trivial for the atomic, boolean, and Kψ cases since
and v ψ.
and v ψ. By the definition of E F , we have v ∈ E(t, ψ). Hence by IH we get M, w Ky i ψ.
The above theorem is due to the lack of expressivity of our language: we cannot express that t: ϕ as in justification logic. Then M F can simply ignore the non-factive explanations for each ϕ without affecting the truth value of ELKy formulas. 12 Now we consider the introspective models.
It is then easy to show:
Theorem 10 For any set Γ ∪ {ϕ}, Γ C I ϕ if and only if Γ C F I ϕ.
Theorems 8 and 10 showed that explanation factivity is neglectable w.r.t. the logic.
In the following, we present two proof systems which differ only on the introspection axioms of Ky i essentially. In the next section, we will show their completeness w.r.t. C and C I , respectively.
IMP says "knowing that" is necessary for "knowing why". 4YK is the positive introspection of "knowing why" by "knowing that". 13 The reader may wonder about the corresponding negative introspection of 4YK and it is provable in SKY.
Proof
(1)
Note that the choice of Λ and NECKY in SKY also give us some flexibility in the logic. System SKYI is obtained by replacing 4, 5 and 4YK in SKY by the those four stronger introspection axioms of Ky i :
Proposition 12 The following are provable in SKYI
Soundness and completeness
Due to Theorems 8 and 10, we only need to prove soundness and completeness w.r.t. C and C I instead of C F and C F I respectively.
Theorem 13 (Soundness) SKY and SKYI are sound for C and C I respectively.
Proof Since ELKy-models are based on S5 Kripke models, the standard axioms of system S5 are all valid. So we just need to check the rest. First we check the non-trivial axioms and rules of SKY on C.
. Therefore it follows that Ky i ϕ. Hence NECKY is valid.
Validity of the introspection axioms of SKYI on C I are trivial based on the introspective property and the fact that R i is an equivalence relation.
Remark 1 Note that the rule of replacement is not valid, e.g., the validity of ϕ ↔ ψ does not entail the validity of Ky i ϕ ↔ Ky i ψ.
To establish completeness, we build a canonical model for each consistent set of ELKy formulas. We will first show the completeness of SKY over C, and the completeness of SKYI over C I is then straightforward.
Let Ω be the set of all maximal SKY-consistent sets of formulas. For any maximal consistent set (abbr. MCS) Γ , let
that F and f satisfy the conditions below}:
In the above we write f for { f i | i ∈ I}. Essentially, f i is a witness function picking one t for each formula in {ϕ | Ky i ϕ ∈ Γ }. It can be used to construct the possible worlds for the existence lemma for ¬Ky i ϕ. We do need such witness functions for each i, since i, j can have different explanations for ϕ. In the definition of R c i , we need to make sure the selected witnesses are the same for i. We include ϕ ∈ ELKy as building blocks in E c for technical convenience, as it will become more clear below when we construct the successors. The component F in each world is used to encode the information of E c locally, also for the technical convenience to define the canonical relations. Note that merely maximal consistent sets are not enough in constructing the canonical model, as in the case of the logic of knowing what by Fan (2013, 2014) . Now we need to show that the canonical model is well-defined:
-E c satisfies conditions (I) and (II) in the definition of ELKy-models.
-R c i is an equivalence relation. -W c is not empty. Actually, we will prove a stronger one: for any Γ ∈ Ω, there exist F and f such that Γ , F, f ∈ W c .
Proposition 15 E c satisfies the conditions (I) and (II) of ELKy-models.
Before proceeding further, we prove the following handy proposition.
By the property of MCS, we have ¬Ky i ϕ ∈ Γ . By the provable 5YK (¬Ky i ϕ → K i ¬Ky i ϕ) and the property of MCS, we have
By axiom 4 and the property of MCS, we have
Proposition 17 R c i is an equivalence relation. Proof We just need to prove R c i is reflexive, transitive, and symmetric.
In order to establish that for any Γ ∈ Ω, there exist F and f such that Γ , F, f ∈ W c , we define the following construction.
Definition 18
Given any Γ ∈ Ω, construct F Γ and f Γ as follows:
By the construction of F Γ n (n ∈ N), {F Γ n | n ∈ N} is monotonic. i.e., ∀m, n ∈ N , if m n, then F Γ m ⊆ F Γ n .
Proposition 19 For any
Hence, we have that F Γ and f Γ satisfy condition (iii).
This completes the proof that M c is well-defined. Now we can establish the existence lemmas for K i and Ky i .
Proof Suppose K i ϕ ∈ Γ . We will construct a Δ, G, g such that Γ , F, f R c Δ, G, g and ϕ ∈ Δ.
Suppose not, then there are Ky i ψ 1 , · · · , Ky i ψ m , χ 1 , · · · , χ n ∈ Δ − such that SKY Ky i ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ Ky i ψ m ∧ χ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ χ n → ¬ϕ.
Then
by propositional resoning,
By Ky i ψ j ∈ Γ and axiom 4YK, we have K i Ky i ψ j ∈ Γ . Since K i χ j ∈ Γ , it follows that K i ¬ϕ ∈ Γ , i.e., ¬ K i ϕ ∈ Γ . But this is impossible: Γ is an MCS containing K i ϕ. We conclude that Δ − is consistent. Let Δ be any MCS containing Δ − , such extensions exist by a Lindenbaum-like argument. It follows that for any Ky i ϕ, Ky i ϕ ∈ Γ iff Ky i ϕ ∈ Δ:
-Suppose Ky i ϕ ∈ Γ . By the construction of Δ, we have Ky i ϕ ∈ Δ.
-Suppose Ky i ϕ ∈ Δ and Ky i ϕ / ∈ Γ . By the property of MCS, we have ¬Ky i ϕ ∈ Γ . By Proposition 11, we have K i ¬Ky i ϕ ∈ Γ . By the construction of Δ, we have ¬Ky i ϕ ∈ Δ. Contradiction.
In the following, we construct G and g to form a world Δ, G, g in W c . Based on the above result, we can simply let g i = f i . We just need to construct g j for j = i. Formally, let:
Since F ⊆ G and G is closed under implication, conditions (i) and (ii) are obvious. For condition (iii), if Ky i ϕ ∈ Δ, then Ky i ϕ ∈ Γ . Thus
Condition (iii) also holds if Ky j ϕ ∈ Δ for j = i by definition of G 0 . It follows that Δ, G, g ∈ W c . By the construction of Δ, G, g , we have ϕ ∈ Δ, Γ # i ⊆ Δ, and f i = g i . Therefore there exists a state Δ, G, g ∈ W c such that Γ , F, f R c i Δ, G, g and ϕ ∈ Δ.
To refute Ky i ψ semantically, for each explanation t for ψ at the current world, we need to construct an accessible world where t is not an explanation for ψ. This leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 21 (Ky
Proof Suppose Ky i ψ / ∈ Γ , Γ , F, f ∈ W c , and t, ψ ∈ F. We construct Δ, G, g as follows:
Throughout this proof we write |s| > |t| to express that t is proper subterm of s. From the construction of G, it is clear that for any s, ϕ ∈ Ψ , we have |s| > |t|. We can show that for any Ky i ϕ / ∈ Γ , if s, ϕ ∈ G 0 then s, ϕ ∈ Ψ . Towards contradiction, suppose that Ky i ϕ / ∈ Γ and s, ϕ ∈ F\Ψ , then s, ϕ ∈ F, thus s, ϕ ∈ Ψ by the definition of Ψ , contradiction. It follows:
The idea behind the construction of G is to first replace any current explanation for ψ with something longer, and then take the closure w.r.t. implication. Note that for technical convenience, we treat all ϕ such that Ky i ϕ / ∈ Γ in the basic step together. Now we prove the following claims.
Claim 1 Δ, G, g ∈ W c . i.e., G satisfies the conditions in the definition of W c .
(i) Suppose r , ϕ 1 → ϕ 2 , s, ϕ 1 ∈ G. By the construction of G, there exists n ∈ N such that r , ϕ 1 → ϕ 2 , s, ϕ 1 ∈ G n . By the construction of G n+1 , we have r · s, ϕ 2 ∈ G n+1 . Thus r · s, ϕ 2 ∈ G. (ii) Suppose ϕ ∈ Λ. Then e, ϕ ∈ F. Since ϕ is a tautology, by NECKY and the property of MCS, we have Ky i ϕ ∈ Γ . Thus e, ϕ / ∈ Ψ . Thus e, ϕ ∈ G 0 . Hence e, ϕ ∈ G. (iii) Suppose Ky j ϕ ∈ Δ ( j ∈ I). By Δ = Γ , we get Ky j ϕ ∈ Γ . Thus f j (ϕ), ϕ ∈ F.
We have two cases:
To prove this claim, we just need to check two conditions:
dom(g i )=dom( f i ). For any ϕ ∈ {ϕ | Ky i ϕ ∈ Δ}, since f i (ϕ), ϕ / ∈ Ψ , by the definition of g i , we have g i (ϕ) = f i (ϕ). Hence g i = f i .
To prove t, ψ / ∈ G, we first prove the following useful claim:
Claim 3 If Ky i ϕ / ∈ Γ and s, ϕ ∈ G n+1 \G n , then |s| > |t|.
Suppose Ky i ϕ / ∈ Γ . Do induction on n:
n = 0. Suppose s, ϕ ∈ G 1 \G 0 . Then there exists s 1 , s 2 , and χ such that s = s 1 · s 2 , s 1 , χ → ϕ , s 2 , χ ∈ G 0 . We have two cases:
n > 0. Suppose s, ϕ ∈ G n+1 \G n . Then there exist s 1 , s 2 , χ such that s = s 1 · s 2 and s 1 , χ → ϕ , s 2 , χ ∈ G n . Moreover, we find that
since otherwise s, ϕ ∈ G n by the definition of G n . Then we have
We have the following cases:
-Ky i (χ → ϕ) / ∈ Γ and s 1 , χ → ϕ ∈ G n \G n−1 . By IH, we have |s 1 | > |t|. Hence |s| > |t|.
-Ky i χ / ∈ Γ and s 2 , χ ∈ G n \G n−1 . By IH, we have |s 2 | > |t|. Hence |s| > |t|. -Ky i (χ → ϕ) / ∈ Γ and s 1 , χ → ϕ ∈ G n−1 . If s 1 , χ → ϕ ∈ G 0 , then we have |s 1 | > |t| by (1); If s 1 , χ → ϕ / ∈ G 0 , then there exists 0 < k < n such that s 1 , χ → ϕ ∈ G k \G k−1 . Thus by IH we have |s 1 | > |t|. Thus |s| > |t|.
-Ky i χ / ∈ Γ and s 2 , χ ∈ G n−1 . Similar to the above.
According to the construction of G, we just need to show that for all n ∈ N, t, ψ / ∈ G n . By (2), we already know t, ψ / ∈ G 0 . Based on Claim 3, t, ψ cannot be added in any G n for n ≥ 1. We conclude t, ψ / ∈ G. Finally we are ready to prove the truth lemma. Proof This is established by standard induction on the complexity of ϕ. The atomic cases and the boolean cases are standard. The case when ϕ = K i ψ is also routine based on Lemma 20. Consider the case that ϕ is Ky i ψ for some ψ.
⇐ If Ky i ψ ∈ Γ , then for any Δ, G, g such that Γ , F, f R c i Δ, G, g , we have then Ky i ψ ∈ Δ by the definition of R c i . Since SKY Ky i ψ → ψ (by T and IMP), we have ψ ∈ Δ. By IH, we have Δ, G, g ψ. Since Ky i ψ ∈ Γ and Ky i ψ ∈ Δ, we have f i (ψ), ψ ∈ F and g i (ψ), ψ ∈ G. By the definition of R c i , we have f i = g i . Thus there exists
We have two cases as follows:
-K i ψ / ∈ Γ : then by Lemma 20 and the semantics, Γ , F, f Ky i ψ. -Kψ ∈ Γ : We also have two cases: By Theorems 8 and 23, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 24 (Completeness of SKY over C F ) Σ C F ϕ implies Σ SKY ϕ. Now let us look at the completeness of SKYI. The crucial observation is that we can use the same canonical model definition except now we let Ω be the set of all maximal SKYI-consistent set of ELKy formulas. The similar propositions follow due to Proposition 12. The only extra thing is to check whether the new canonical model has the introspection property.
Proposition 25 M c has introspection property.
Proof Suppose Γ , F, f ϕ and ϕ has the form of K i ψ or ¬K i ψ or Ky i ψ or ¬Ky i ψ. By Lemma 22, we have ϕ ∈ Γ . By the axioms 4KY-5Y and the properties of MCS, we have Ky i ϕ ∈ Γ . By Lemma 22, we have Γ , F, f
Based on the above proposition and Theorem 10 we have:
Theorem 26 (Completeness of SKYI over C I and C F I ) If Σ C I ϕ, then Σ SKYI ϕ. If Σ C F I ϕ, then Σ SKYI ϕ.
Comparison with justification logic
In this section, we compare our framework with justification logic. We first explain our deviations from the standard justification logic, and then give an alternative semantics of our logic SKY, which is technically closer to the standard setting of justification logic.
Similarities and differences
The language of the most classic justification logic LP [i.e., JT4 by Artemov (2008)] includes both formulas ϕ and justification terms t:
The possible-world semantics of justification logic is based on the Fitting model S, R, E, V where S, R, V is a single-agent Kripke model and E is an evidence function assigning justification terms t to formulas on each world, just as in our setting. The formula t: ϕ has the following semantics [cf. e.g., Fitting (2016) 
Compared to our semantics for Ky i ϕ, note that (a) only requires that t is a justification of ϕ on the current world w. The Fitting models for LP are assumed to have further conditions: 14
(5) R is reflexive and transitive.
Note that we also require (1) and (5) above and include · as an operation on explanations in E semantically. On the other hand, we leave out (2) (3) (4) and the operations + and ! for specific considerations in our setting. For the case of +, consider the following model where ϕ has two possible explanations and agent i cannot distinguish them (thus ¬Ky i ϕ holds). t: ϕ i s: ϕ
If we impose condition (2) then s + t is a uniform explanation of ϕ on both worlds, which makes Ky i ϕ true. More generally, for any finite model where ϕ has some explanations on each world, Ky i ϕ will always be true under condition (2), which is counterintuitive in our setting. Conceptually, the explanation should be precise, you cannot explain a theorem by saying one of all the possible proofs up to a certain length works. Knowing there is a proof does not mean you know why the theorem holds. Operation ! and conditions (3) and (4) are relevant to the validity of the axiom t: ϕ → !t: (t: ϕ) in the justification logic LP, which is used to realize axiom 4 in modal logic. Intuitively, ! is the proof checker and !t will always be a justification of t: ϕ. 15 Although we do not have t : ϕ in the language, it may sound reasonable to include ! and require E(t, ϕ) ⊆ E(!t, Ky i ϕ). However, t being an explanation for ϕ does not entail that t can be transformed uniformly into an explanation for Ky i ϕ. For example, the window is broken since someone threw a rock at it, but there can be different explanations for an agent to know why the window is broken: she saw it, or someone told her about it, and so on.
The technically motivated condition (4) in justification logic requires that any accessible possible world has more explanations than the actual world, which is not reasonable in our setting: an undesired consequence of condition (4) would be w ∈ E(t, ϕ) and w K i ϕ imply w Ky i ϕ.
There are justification logics available with both ϕ and t : ϕ, see, e.g., Artemov and Nogina (2005) and Kuznets and Studer (2012) . Justification terms are used to represent explicit knowledge whereas the -operator is used for implicit knowledge. Hence these logics feature the principle
which is based on the idea that one may implicitly know more than what is explicitly justified. Note that in the presence of the !-operation, the principle (3) implies
Indeed, by (3) we have !t : (t : ϕ) → (t : ϕ), which together with the axiom t : ϕ → !t: (t: ϕ) yields (4). The formulas (3) and (4) correspond in our setting to the axioms Ky i ϕ → K i ϕ and Ky i ϕ → K i Ky i ϕ, respectively. In some versions of multi-agent justification logic, e.g. Bucheli et al. (2011) and Renne (2012) , the evidence function E is agent-dependent (or, equivalently, each agent has her own justifications), and correspondingly the formula t : i ϕ is introduced into the language to express that t is a justification of ϕ for i. However, in our models, we use a uniform function E for all agents since we think the explanatory relation between explanations and formulas is also part of the possible worlds, just like basic propositional facts, which are interpreted by a valuation function independent from the agents.
Justification logics are parameterized by a constant specification (CS), a collection of c: ϕ formulas where c is a justification constant and ϕ is an axiom of the justification logic. It controls which axioms the logic provides justifications for, i.e. which axioms an agent may use in her justified reasoning process. A justification logic model meets the requirement of a given CS if W = E(c, ϕ) for all c: ϕ ∈ CS. In contrast, we include only tautologies (but not all axioms) in our tautology ground Λ. For example, if we had (K i ϕ → ϕ) ∈ Λ, then we could derive Ky i (K i ϕ → ϕ) by NECKY, which would imply Ky i K i ϕ → Ky i ϕ by DISTY. That, however, would be a strange consequence: e.g., I know why I know that the window is broken implies that I know why it is broken.
The table below highlights the similarities between our axioms (or derivable theorems in SKY and SKYI) and axioms in (variants of) justification logic when viewing t: ϕ as Ky i ϕ: (Artemov and Nogina 2005) Ky i ϕ → K i ϕ t: ϕ → t: ϕ (Artemov and Nogina 2005) Ky i ϕ → K i Ky i ϕ ¬t: ϕ → ¬t: ϕ (Artemov and Nogina 2005) ¬Ky
To close this comparison, note that Fitting proposed a quantified justification logic by Fitting (2008) , and discussed briefly in the end what can be expressed if the language also includes the normal knowledge operator. Since Ky i implicitly includes quantification over explanations, our language can then be viewed as a fragment of this quantified justification logic extended with K.
An alternative semantics
The similarities between our work and justification logic make it technically possible to give a more standard justification logic semantics to ELKy-formulas. In the following we evaluate formulas over multi-agent Fitting models, see, e.g., Bucheli et al. (2011) and Renne (2012) , where each agent has her own accessibility relation and evidence function. 16 We call these models JL-models. The interpretation of agent i knows why ϕ is given as agent i knows that ϕ and has some justification of ϕ, that is knowing why translates to having a justification.
We consider our results about JL-models to be technical observations that show why we developed ELKy-models to give semantics to the logic of knowing why instead of simply using standard justification logic models. JL-models are in fact rather weak for our purpose. This can be seen from the fact that a lot of information is lost in the translation from ELKy-models to JL-models, in particular JL-models only store known explanations but all other possible explanations are dropped. Hence JL-models cannot really talk about the difference between ∃xKE(x, ϕ) and K∃x E(x, ϕ) , which is essential for our analysis of knowing why. Moreover, this JL-like semantics cannot handle conditional knowledge-why, as will be introduced formally in the last section of this paper. For example, it is reasonable to have a situation where I don't know why ϕ right now, but I know why ϕ given the information ψ, since the extra information of ψ may rule out some possibilities such that there is a uniform explanation on the remaining possibilities. Due to Remark 2, this is not possible in a monotonic S5 (or S4) JL-model.
is an admissible evidence function satisfying the following conditions:
Remark 2 Note that by imposing monotonicity on S5 models, all i-indistinguishable worlds have the same justifications for the same formula, i.e., if w R i v then
Definition 28 (Semantics)
The satisfaction relation of ELKy-formulas on pointed JL-models is as below:
Compared to our semantics, the crucial difference in the above semantics of Ky i ϕ is that it only requires that t is a justification on the current world w.
Theorem 29 (Soundness) SKY is sound for JL-models.
Proof
Since JL-models are based on S5 Kripke models, the standard axioms of system S5 are all valid. So we just need to check the rest. (t, ϕ) . We obtain v J Ky i ϕ and conclude w J K i Ky i ϕ. NECKY Suppose ϕ ∈ Λ. By condition (II) on E i , we get w ∈ E i (e, ϕ) for any w.
Since Λ is a set of tautologies, we also have that w R i v implies v J ϕ. Hence Ky i ϕ is valid.
To establish completeness of SKY with respect to JL-models, we show how to transform a given ELKy-model into an equivalent JL-model. Then completeness for JL-models is a consequence of completeness for ELKy-models.
Definition 30 (Corresponding JL-model) Given an ELKy-model
we define the corresponding JL-model M J as
The above definition indeed yields a JL-model. Moreover, any given ELKy-model M and its corresponding JL-model M J satisfy the same formulas. We have the following two lemmas.
Lemma 31
Let M be an ELKy-model, then M J is a JL-model.
Proof
We have to verify the conditions on E J : E(t, ϕ) and hence also v ∈ E(s · t, ψ). By the definition of E J i we conclude w ∈ E J i (s · t, ψ). Corollary 33 (Completeness) SKY is strongly complete for JL-models.
Proof Suppose Γ ϕ. By completeness with respect to ELKy-models, there is an ELKy-model M with a world w such that M, w Γ but M, w ϕ. By the previous two lemmas, we find a JL-model M J such that M J , w J Γ but M J , w J ϕ.
The results in this section show that SKY does have a standard justification logic semantics although its language does not include explicit justifications. In this sense, the logic of knowing why sits in between modal logic and justification logic. Hence it is natural to ask whether there is a realization theorem for SKY and which system of justification logic SKY corresponds to (Artemov 2001; Fitting 2016; Kuznets and Studer 2019) . For now, we have to leave this question open.
Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we present an attempt to formalize the logic of knowing why. In the language we have both the standard knowing that operator K i and the new knowing why operator Ky i . A semantics based on Fitting-like models for justification logic is given, which interprets knowing why ϕ as there exists an explanation such that I know it is one explanation for ϕ. We gave two proof systems, one weaker and one stronger depending on the choice of introspection axioms, and showed their completeness over various model classes.
Note that, in the logic of knowing value Fan 2013, 2014) , there is one and only one value for each constant. However, there can be different explanations for the same fact in our setting. This difference also leads to some technical complications in the completeness proof: to negate Ky i ϕ, it is not enough to just construct another world. Instead, for each explanation t of ϕ at the current world, we need to construct one world to refute it.
As the title shows, it is by no means the logic of knowing why. Besides the introspection axioms, there are a lot to be discussed. 17 For example, although DISTY looks reasonable in a setting focusing on deductive explanations, it may cause troubles if causal explanations or other types of explanations are considered. Recall our example about the flagpole and its shadow. It is reasonable to assume that I know why the shadow is y meters long (Ky i p), and I also know why that the shadow is y meters implies the pole is x meters long (Ky i ( p → q) ). However, it does not entail that I know why the pole is x meters long (Ky i q) if we are looking for causal explanation (or functional explanation). One way to go around is to replace the material implication by some other relevant (causal) conditional, then Ky i ( p → q) may not hold in this setting anymore.
It seems that we often do not have clear semantic intuition about non-trivial expressions of knowing why. One reason is that there may be different readings of the same statement of knowing why ϕ regarding different aspects of ϕ and different types of desired explanations. For example, "I know why Frank went to Beijing on Monday" may have different meanings depending on the contrast the speaker wants to emphasize (van Fraassen 1980): -I know why Frank, not Mary, went to Beijing on Monday.
-I know why Frank went to Beijing, not Shanghai, on Monday.
-I know why Frank went to Beijing on Monday, not on Tuesday. Following Koura (1988) , we may partially handle this by adding contrast formulas, e.g., turn Ky i ϕ into Ky i (ϕ ∧ ¬ψ ∧ ¬χ ∧ . . . ) depending on the emphasis. However, we cannot handle the changes of types of explanations depending on the contrast.
Another future direction is to study the inner structure of explanations further. The early work by Hintikka and Halonen (1995) may turn out to be helpful, where explanations can be of the form of universally quantified formulas, which connects better with the existing theories of scientific explanations in philosophy of science. 18 Moreover, we may be interested in saying whether an explanation is true, and knowing why an explanation holds. An extended language with explanations as formulas can also let us handle more reasoning patterns w.r.t. wh-compliments such as those discussed by Groenendijk and Stokhof (1982) , e.g., given John knows why Mary was late, then from Mary was late because of the traffic jam, we can infer that John knows that there was a traffic jam.
A promising future study is about group notions of knowing why. For example, how do we define everyone knows why ϕ? Simply having a conjunction of Ky i ϕ for each i may not be enough, since people can have different explanations for ϕ. The case a type of explicit knowledge. One important approach to define explicit knowledge is by using awareness: ϕ is a piece of explicit knowledge of i (X i ϕ) if i is aware of ϕ (A i ϕ) and i implicitly knows that ϕ (K i ϕ), where awareness is often defined syntactically [cf. Fagin et al. (1995) ]. Accordingly, the axioms are also changed, e.g., the K axiom now becomes X i (ϕ → ψ) ∧ X i ϕ ∧ A i ψ → X i ψ. Other approaches to explicit knowledge use the idea of algorithmic knowledge (Halpern and Pucella 2011) . We may explore the concrete connection in the future.
